Like many immature and fledgling democracies Israel has suffered from the same disease, whieh eauses instability, ineCficieney, maladministration, eorrnption, bribery, extortion and anarchy. However, unlike other eountries, Israel has invented its own medication to eure the ilis of its democratic system. This unpreccdented "magie remedy" providcd Israel with the distinetion of being the first democraey to a have direct election for its prime minister. This study is dedicated to the examination of this "untested remcdy" and its side effects. As the paper shows, the direct elections have totally altered the form of government, party system, eleetoral campaigns, and the voting bchaviours in the Jewish State. By allowing the split-tieket voting (Le. the scparate voting for prime minister and Knesset), the new system has eontributed to the further fragmentation of Israeli party system, strengthening the ethno-seetarian and single-issue parties at the expcnse of larger and ideological ones. In addition, while it has modified the traditional inter and intra-party politics and tradilional eoalition formation procedures, it also starkly exposed the absenee of cheeks and balanees within the system. KEYWORDS Isracı; Israeli Politics; Knesset; Likud; Labour; Ethno-sectarianism; Election Systems; Elecloral Behaviour. The system of direct elections for the prime minister has shattered the Israeli political structure and made Israel an "ungovernable" country. As the new electoral system quickly destroyed Netanyahu and Barak, now it is predicted that Sharon will soo n share the same destiny with his predecessors and be tom down by this destructive system in asimilar fashion. Since 1996, regardless of who has been in power, the negative implications of direct elections have persistently disabled the Israeli prime ministers to control their governments, caused them to lose their parliamentary majorityand call early elections each time. As a result, while the electoral system has become enormously crucial in Israeli politics, the identity or personality of the prime minister cc as ed to be an important factor in terms of manageability of the country. Now, the prime minister is not more than someone who is to play a pre-designated role and be destroyed by the system. Hence, to understand the implications of the direct elections upon the Israeli politics, one must draw upon the elections that are simultaneously held both for the Knesset and the prime minister. Therefore, for that matter, i shall limit the scopc of this paper to only 1996 and 1999 elections rather than the February 2001 elections, which only replaced the incumbent Prime Minister Barak with Sharon and did not change the composition of parliament at alL.
The system of direct elections for the prime minister has shattered the Israeli political structure and made Israel an "ungovernable" country. As the new electoral system quickly destroyed Netanyahu and Barak, now it is predicted that Sharon will soo n share the same destiny with his predecessors and be tom down by this destructive system in asimilar fashion. Since 1996, regardless of who has been in power, the negative implications of direct elections have persistently disabled the Israeli prime ministers to control their governments, caused them to lose their parliamentary majorityand call early elections each time. As a result, while the electoral system has become enormously crucial in Israeli politics, the identity or personality of the prime minister cc as ed to be an important factor in terms of manageability of the country. Now, the prime minister is not more than someone who is to play a pre-designated role and be destroyed by the system. Hence, to understand the implications of the direct elections upon the Israeli politics, one must draw upon the elections that are simultaneously held both for the Knesset and the prime minister. Therefore, for that matter, i shall limit the scopc of this paper to only 1996 and 1999 elections rather than the February 2001 elections, which only replaced the incumbent Prime Minister Barak with Sharon and did not change the composition of parliament at alL.
Like many immature and fledgling democracies Israel has suffered from the same disease which causes instability, inefficiency, maladministration, corruption, bribery, extortion and anarchy. However, unlike other countnes, Isracı has invented its own medication to cure the iııs of its democratic system. This unprecedented "magic remedy" provided Isracl with the distinction of being the first democracy to a have direct elcction for its prime minister. This study is dedicated to the examination of this "untcsted remcdy" and its side-effects. The primary aim over the course of this papcr will be to denote the implications of this reform upon the various aspccts of Israeli politics. However, it should be notcd that considering this reform merely as a change in the elcctoral system would be a great mistake. As i shall examine below, the direct eIections have totaIIy altered the form of government, party system, electoral campaigns, and the voting behaviours in the Jewish State. By allowing the spIit-ticket voting (Le. the separate voting for prime minister and Knesset), the new system has contributed to the further fragmentation of IsraeIi party system and simultaneously strengthening the ethno-sectarian and single-issue parties at the expense of larger and ideological ones. In addition, while it has modified the traditional inter and intraparty politics and traditional coalition formation procedures, it also starkly exposed the absence of check s and balances within the system.
Diagnosis of the Malaise and the ii Magic Remedy"
Until 1977, the extremely fragmented, fractionaIised and polarised nature of the Israeli party system was masked by the dominance of Mapai. 1 However, since then, particularly during the i980s, this weakness of the system has Icd to difficulties not only in the formation of governments, but in their survival as weıı.2 Weak governments and frequent crises cam e to be perceived as extremcly disruptive to the stability of Israel's democracy by both the c1ectorate and the politicians. 3 The ineffectiveness of the government's decision-making process, the long period of bargaining required to form coalitions, the proIiferation of smail parties with blackmail potential and the "stinky trick" experience of 1990 intensified the attempts for electoral reform. Hereafter, diagnosing the existing malaise of the Israeli political and electoral system, i shall take a closer look at the complaints raised by those who were supporting the elcctoral reform.
One of the motivations fOr electora] reform was the resull of past tensions in the creation and survival of political coalitions:
10riginaııy, an acronym for Isracl Workcrs' Party. Crcated in 1930, it was the dominant party in Isracı until its mergcr in 1968 with Ahdut Haavoda and Rafi to form Ismcl Labour Party. 2y. Bogdanor, "Isracı Dcbaıcs Reform", Journal of Derrwcracy, Yol. 4, No. I, 1993, p. 69. 
3R. Y. Hazan, "Exccutive-Legislative Rclations In An Era of Accelcrated
Reform: Rcshaping Government in Isracl", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Yol. 22, No. 3, 1997, p. 331. [VOL. XXX This kind of situation gaye disproportionate influence to small parti es whose support could make the difference between a party capable of forming a government and one incapable of doing so.4 Since 1977, the developing close compctition between Labour and Likud has commanded the support of roughly equal portions of the Israeli electorate. This has provided the smailer parti es with considerable blackmail potentiaL. S With two competing parties seeking to form coalitions with the same smaller parties as necessary partners, logic of capitulation was set into motion. Playing one large party off against the other, the smaIl parti es were in a position to constantly up the ante by transforming the promises made by one side into baseline demands for negotiating with the other. In this way, the smaIler partiesat times even individual members of Knesset used to extract staggering political prices from their larger counterparts. 6 This rendered smaIl parti es and individual members far more powerful than their numbers in the elcctorate warrant. In the middle of the way by switching side, threatening to form a coalition with the opposing major party, elements representing a smaIl minority could make outrages and extortionate demands. Thus, this created governments that habituaIly flouted the will of the majority.? Broadly speaking, this meant subjugation of the majority's will and interest to those of the minority.8
Beyond this political price, this horse-trading had a financial cost as welL. These tricky relations engendered tremendous waste of national sources due to horse-trading, briberies, private budget allocations to religious funds and scminaries (yeshivot) . As a result, billions of shekels were annually handed out to smail extortionist groups, particularly the religious oncs. 9 4G. Mahler, "The Forming of the Netanyahu Government: CoalitionFormation In A Quasi-Parliamentary Setting", Israel Affairs, Yol. 3, No. 3-4, 1997, p. 4. SBogdanor, Israel Debates Reform, p. 69 . 6B. Susser, "The Direct Elcclion of the Priıne Minister: A Balance Sheet", Israel Affairs, Yol. 4, No. i, 1997 , p. 239. 7Editorial, "Emasculated Reform", Jerusalem Post, 10 January 1992 . 8U. Lynn, "Labour Supporters Turned Sabotcurs", Jerusalem Post, 24 June 1994 9c. Herzog, "Half Baked Reform", Jerusalem Post, 20 January 1995. The vulnerability of the govcmmcm and the prime minister in particular to extortion of individual, sectarian, ethnic and parochial interest groups undermined the executive branch. The prime minister was unable to prevent the frequent cabinet crises brought on by inter-party and intra-party political manoeuvring. His authority vis-a-vis his ministers was limited and he himself was dependem on the m for political support. Since each minister represented a party or faction within a party, the premier had to tolerate his ministers' blatant failures, destructive feuds and flagrant transgressions in silent frustration. Apparenlly, the prime minister was nothing more than a hostage held by smaIl coa1ition partners.
David Libai, a Labour MK (Member of Knesset) and one of the initiators of reform process, summarised the existing situation as of May 1990, by foIlowing words:
Eleetions are held, and no one knows who wiIl be prime minister. Not only because it is amalter for eoalition negotiations, but because a situation has bccn created where parties, espccially smaIl ones, are the ones who decide. At times the decision is made not within the party but without, by an authority or a great rabbi. The whim of a single Knesset member ean deeide not only who wiIl be the prime minister but alsa the fate of the people. ıo
In this respect, it may be daimed that the choice and composition of the govemment were practieaIly out of the hands of the voters. This has basieaIly shaken the conIidenee of the broad publie in system of government and more dangerously in democracy. This situation was exacerbated by the National Unity experiences in the Iate 1980s and early 1990s. Actually, the inflated pub1ic desire for the replacement of this corrupt and unstable system was exploded by the spark of March-June 1990 crisis.
In talking about the National Unity Governments (1984-1988 and 1988-1990) one may say that after the elections for the 1 1th Knesset, it became apparent that the National Unity Govemment had difficulties in funetioning. Since it was composed of two parties with diametrically opposed outlooks and interests, members of the govemment wasted a great dea! of energy and state ıolerusalem Centre for Publie Affairs, Direct Election of the Prime Miniseer, Changing the System ofCovernmenı in Israel, lerusalcm, 1990, p. 43. [VOL. XXX resourees in internal squabblcs and rivalries that eneumbered the effıcient funetioning of the governmenL II The crisis that finaııy toppled the government was initiated by Labour against the Likud's imransigem position toward the peaee process. The motion of noconfidence sponsored by RATZl2 was passed on 15 March 1990 by 60 votes to 55 and brought down the Likud-led second National Unity GovernmenL This was the fırst time in history of the Israeli parliamemary system that a governmem was forced out of office by a no-confıdence vote.
The "dirty exercise", a ph rase coined by Yitzhak Rabin, was Shimon Peres's master plan to end the National Unity Government and then replace it with a coalition based on the Labour Party and one or more of the religious parties with himself as prime minister. After the President asked Peres to form and head a new government he started to use "every trick in the book" in order to persuade the pivotal Shas 13 (as well as other religious parties) to participate in his governmenL l4 Mcanwhile, the Likud was busy trying to block Peres's attempt and prenegotiating its own governmenL Finally, Likud suceceded in forming a narrow eoaIition. Thus, the notorious mthy trick of Labour failed and brought about a major public outcry for the reform of the political system. As Larry Diamond and Ehud Sprinzak point out:
In fact, the three-month crisis was unprecedented in one sense: it starkly exposed the malfunctioning of the Israeli system of govemment and, more than ever before, made most Israelis aware of ıhe problem. But almosı everything that took place bctween March and June of 1990 had happened before: coaliıion horse-trading; poliLİcal blackmail and exıorlion by smail extremist parties; shamelessly open poliıical bribery; blaLanl and obsessive partisanship by ıhe nation's top policymakers; complcıe disregard for matters of national interesl. What was special about the 1990 spring crisis was thaı iı happened on a larger and more inıense scalc. The spiritual gurus of ıhe ultra-orıhodox partiesanLi-Zionisı rabbi s in their eighties and This aborted and senscless process of tunnoil into which the political system was thrown and lhe ugly horse-trading and political blackmail ıhat accompanied iı triggered the emergence of a protest movement in favour of changing the elcctoral and governmental systems. It involved hunger strikes, a petition signed by over half million citizens and a mass demonstration in Tel Aviv. 16 According to a Gallup poll in May 1990,89 per cent of the public was supporting the electoral refonn. 17 The result was an almost automatic inclination of politicians to support overtly "popular" proposals for re fo nn , regardless of their content and consequences. This trend became more evident prior to general elections in 1992.
As a response, refonn followed. In February 1991, the Knesset reacted to this unseemly chain of events by passing legislation intended to change basic parliamentary norms. According to new amendment (No: 12) to Basic Law: the Knesset, a MK who resigned from the partyon whose list he or she was elected, or who voted against his or her party line in a confidence or no-confidence vote for the govemment would be penalised. The offending MK would not be recognised as a member of any other party grouping within the Knesset; would not be allowed to run in the next elections on a list represented in the current Knesset; would not be allowed to serve as a minister or deputy minister during the term of the Knesset in which the prohibited act occurred, and would not be entitled to party financing from the 15A. Brichta, "The New Premier-Parliamentary System in Israel", The Annals of the American Academy of Poliıical and Social Science, Vol. 555, 1998, pp. 183-184 Apan from these initiaI reforms, those who wanted a complete change in the system backed to an already existing reform proposaI: direct popular election of the prime minister. Despite the fact that this reform proposaI was submitted to the Knesset in the Iate 1980s, until the last govemment crisis and its aftermath it was not taken into consideration as a feasible solution. However, subsequently the adoption of the direct election for the chief executive was pcrceived as the linchpin that would make Israel get rid of its existing problcms. In fact, it should be recorded here that the allegedly succcss story of the reform at municipaI IeveI in the form of direct elcctions of mayorshelped Iead public opinion in this direction. 20 Under this proposed reform, the prime minister would be elected directly by the people in balloting separate from, but concurrent with, the Knesset. A critical feature of this plan required that the successfuI candidate was to win an absolute majority of the vote, providing for a mnoff election between the two Ieading candidates if none obtained a majority in the fırst raund. Moreover, the most striking featurc of the proposaI was that the directly electcd prime minister wouId not nce d the approval of the Knesset for the appointment of his ministers and it wouId require a 18A. Arian Supporters of this reform argued that direct election of a prime minister would award electoral choice to the voter. The elcctor would be able to choose his prime minister rather than find a prime minister chosen for him after prolonged coalitional negotiations. The citizen would know who was to be prime minister on the moming foIlowing the eleetion. Therefore, potential partners would have to co-operate with the directly elected prime minister, bccause there would be no way of changing the candidate for prime minister short of new elections. In other words, the prime minister, independent of "blackmailing influence of smaller parties" and individual MKs, would be able to run his govemment as a stable and cohesive body.21 As asserted by the reformers, this did not necessarily mean that direct elcctions would eliminate coalition bargaining altogether. However, according to their assertion, it would alter the whole context of coalition formation. Since it is immediately clear who will be forming the government, the entire logic of capitulation would be avoided. 22 Negotiations would be held cither before the elecıions as the smaIl parties publicly throw in their lot wiıh one candidate or another and thus identify themselves with that candidate's platform, or af ter govemment has already been formed (since the prime minister would no longer need the approval of the Knesset for his govemment). 23
The proponents of the reform suggested that direct election of the prime minister would also strengthen the incipient bipolarity and reduce the level of fractionalisation in the Israeli party system. 24 This supposition mainly rested upon two presumptions: First, with a two-round system of election, competition would be centripetaL. Thus, in order to win in the second baIlot a candidate Sıudies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996, p. 19. would have to appeal to the floating vote in the centre; therefore, a successful candidate would probably come from the moderate rather than extreme right or left. 25 Secondly, many electorates would inherently incIine to support the same party (expIicitly, Labour or Likud) with that of the candidate for prime minister whom they would vote, since "spIintering of the vote would no longer be rational in terms of electoral success"26. Therefore, by fortifying the two major parties and weakening the pasition of the smaIl ones, the changing electoral behaviour would decrease the number of parties within the Knesset.
Af ter heated debates and endless poIitical manoeuvring a circumscribed form of the reform bill was finally adopted by the parHament on its last day before disbanding. On 18 March 1992, the Knesset enacted the new Basic Law: The Government (beginning wi th the elections schedulcd for May 1996).27 As put forward above, the primary aim of the reform was to strengthen the prime minister vis-a-vis the Knesset and extortionist smaIl factions in particular. However, the March 1992 amendment to the Basic Law: The Government did not go far enough in fortifying the independence of the prime minister. The Knesset diluted the powers of the prime minister that were proposed by the early drafts of the reform bill, by passing two amendments which stipulated that the parIiament would approve the appointment of ministers and allow an absolute majority (61 MKs) instead of the more weighted majority of 70 to force the premier's resignation. 28 The adoption of this emasculated reform led many outspoken opponents of the law to raise their complaints about the new system. For instance, Diskin of the Hcbrew University of Jerusalem called the law "constitutional disaSler" .29 To those who raised their voice against the direct clcction speculated that the direct election of the premier would greatly increase the leverage of smaIl especially ultra-orthodox parties. Since once voters would have 25y. Bogdanar, "The Elccıoral Sysıem, Governmenl, and Demoeraey", in E.
Sprinzak chosen the premier directly, they would feel free to support the smaller parties. 30 In addition, it was also predicted that the new system would boast the dirty politics and extortion of small parties. The pillar of this supposition was that the prime minister would continue to need small parties, both to ensure his personal election and to form a coalition afLer the Knesset elections. 3 1 Therefore, he would be ready to pay any price and pursue every avenue to get their support. in short, as maintained by many opponents, the new law would not end the existing distasteful activities such as political bribery, corruption and blackmailing but it ensured that the re would be two rounds of all these 32 : while the fırst would take place before the elections for premier, the second would take place when the prime minister-elect tries to secure the support of 61 Knesset members for his govemment. 33 Up to this point i have brieOy summarised the situation in which the new reform emergcd. In diagnosing the malaise of Israeli political system I have also reported some symptoms which are common to many malfunctioning democracies such as political corruption, bribery, extortion and prolonged coalitional negotiations.
However, what makcs Israel diffcrent from other democracies is that Israel inventcd its own unprecedented "magic remedy" for curing the ills of nalion. Falling in an irresistible tomado, many Israelis could not imaginc that a change in the rules would not make politicians hancst, officeholders responsible and voters wise. Like other laws, the electoral laws have also their unintended consequences besides their primary aims. The experiences of many devcloping or immalure democracies have so far proved that due to these unexpected results, the prescribed remedy is often to be worse than the illness itself. Thus, in the following, by attempting to discovcr these side-cffects in the case of Israel, having experienced an untestcd remedy, I will elaborate on the various features of the direct elecıion and its impIications on the Israeli political system. 3. The New System
[VOL. XXX lsrael has a new cleetoral system combining the previous system of eleetion to the Knesset (undcr whieh the Knesset had seleeted the prime minister, as eustomary in parliamemary systems) with the new direct eleetions for the prime minister. The new Basic Law: The Government, which eame ima effeet with the May 1996 eleetions, sets out a detailed legal framework for the new system. Under the provisions of new law, the prime minister sh all be eleeted in the same national general elecıion as the Knesset but by a separate, direct balloL The eandidate for prime minister may be nominated by a partyar group of partics with at least 10 seats in the outgoing Knesset, or by 50,000 enfranehised persons. The eandidate must be a ciLİzen at least 30 years of age, and must head his or her party's list of eandidates for the Knesset.
The law indieates that should no eandidate reeeive more than half of the valid votes in the first raund, the n two weeks latcr, mnoff eleetions are to be hel d between the two eandidates with the highest votes. In the second ballot the eandidate reeeiving the largest number of valid votes beeomes prime minister. Following the eleetions, the prime minister-eleet has 45 days to present his or her eabinet and reeeive a eonfidenee vote from the Knesset. The number of ministers, ineluding the prime minister, must not exeeed 18 or be less than 8. In addition to the prime minister, at least one half of the ministers must be Knesset members. Should the prime minister-eleet not suecessfully present a govemmem to the Knesset within 45 days, speeial eleetions for the prime minister will be held within 60 days.34 If the same candidate is onee again eleeted and fails to present a govemment wiıhin a second 45 days, new eleetions are to be held onee more but that eandidate may not stand for eleetion in the third round. The new system alsa provides that the tenure of the prime minister and the Knesset shall be four years long and they shal1 be eleeted simultaneously unless Knesset eleetions must be repcated (Le. as a result of faulty eleetions) or the law ealls for a special eleetion of the prime minister.
With the inauguration of direct eleetions for prime minister, proeedures for dissolving the Knesset have been amended. New 34Mahler, Forming of the Netanya/ıu Governmcnl, elections for the Kncsset and the prime minister are held when the Knesset rejects the list of ministers proposed by the prime minister; when at least 6 i MKs support a vote of no-confidence in the prime minister, when the Knesset fails to adopt the Budget Law within the three momhs af ter the beginning of the fiscal year; when the Knesset dissolves itself by passing a special law to that effect, or if the prime minister, arter notifying the president, rcsigns and dissolves the Kncsset. Special elcctions for the prime minister are to be hcld when at least 80 mcmbers of the Knesset vote to remove him from office. The Knesset mayaıso remove the prim e minister by a regular majority vote due to a conviction on an office involving moral turpitude; if the prime minister is unable to appoim the spccified minimum of eight ministers to form his govemment;
or if he is permanemly unable to fulfil his functions. 35 In contrast, Israel's Knesset is elected by a proportional reprcsentation list system. According to Basic Law: The Knesset, these elections are held every four years unless carlier elections are callcd. All registered parti es may run in the election. Registration of parties is regulated by lawand is quitc easy, providing that the party does not oppose the existence of Isracı as a Jewish and democratic state. One hundred citizens may apply to the responsible official to be recognised as a political party. A party not rcpresented in the outgoing Knesset that wishes to mn in the next clections must also submit the signatures of 1,500 supporters. The minimum age for a candidate is twenty-one. 36 Lastl y, there are no electoral distriets and the whole coumry serves as a single nation-wide constituency. There is onlyone list of candidates representing each of the political parties. Oxford, 1997, pp. 118-119. by the party (or a group of parties) receives 1.5 per cent or more of the vote, it wins representation in the 120-seat Knesset. Votes are counted on a nation-wide basis, and Knesset seats are allocated in direct proportion to the strength of the list at the polls. For instance, if a party wins a third of the vote, roughly entitling it to forty seats, the first forty names on the list becomes members of Knesset.
Up to this point, i have outlined the new electoral system. Under the provisions of this system the 1996 and 1999 elcctions were held. In the rest of the paper, i will striye to scrutinise the implications of the se recent elections upon the Israeli political structure and the party system in partieular.
The Implieations of Direct Eleetions
When analysing the consequences of the new system, one has to find relevant answers to these following questions: First, what were the objectives of the law as formulated by its authors, and were they actually achieved? Second, what did the eritics claim would oeeur when the prime minister was elected direetly? And, were these predietions bome out by the faets on the ground?39
In striving to answer these queries, it might be claimed that initially, the formulators of the new system wished for it to be cIear, as soon as the eleetions results wcre tabulated, who would be prime minister and who would form the govemment. As far as this limited objective is concemed, the re can be little doubt that direct eleetions system has aceomplished its purpose fully. The other expeetations of the proponents of the new system were that it would invigorate the prime minister; ameliorate the problem of undue smaIl parties; promote the bipolarity and inerease the eentripctal tendeJ:}cies in the party system. 40 On the eontrary, what the last two elcctions bore out is that none of these aims have been achieved so far. However, many supporters still continue to advoeate the eorreetness of the new system by putting forward counter arguments and attributing LO all negative consequences to other reasons. For example, while Uriel Lynn, the former chairman 39Susscr, Direct Election of the Prime Minister, p. 238. 40Brichta, The New Premier, . of the Knesset Law Commillee and one of the initiators of the reform bill, was elucidating the shrinking of the two large parties by their incapacity and past failure to meet the vaters' expectations and needs rather than reckoning it as a result of the new system,41 another proponent argued that the Hebron deal and perpetuation of the implementation of the Oslo Accords thanked to direct elections; otherwise, it would have been impossible under the old system. 42
At this point, dealing wiıh the second question, it might be quite useful to recall the omens revealed by many "doomsayers" conceming the potential consequences of the new system just before the c1ections in i996 and i999. They claimed that negotiations between the coaliıion-maker and its potential electG:-~1 partners would be even more intense and unprincipled than before. This would increase raıher than diminish the bargaining power of smaIl parties. 43 Furthermore, iı was also asserted that direct election would Icad to political fragmentation by fortifying the smaIler parti es at the expense of larger ones. 44 On ground of evidences handed out by the recent elecıions in i996 and i999, it should be noted here that whereas the criıics on extreme fractionalisation due to split-voting were totally right, wiıh regard to the opponents' fırst c1aim, it is more diffıcult to reach a fina! judgement because of the contrasting results posed by those two consecutive elections. While many commentators were attribuıing Netanyahu's quick coalition formation process (almost two week s) to the new system and its effıciency, these arguments ceased to be convincing after Barak's seven weeks long coalition bargaining following the May 1999 elections. 45 LastIy, it should be also recorded here that same critics mentioned the possibility of facing a hostile Knesset for the directly elected prime minisıer. However, it has be en. so far proved Finaııy, after arefinement, the consequences and implications of the new system might be summarised as follows: changing electoral behaviour-split voting, extreme fractionalisation, ascendancy of smail parties, emasculation of Labour and Likud, centralisation of power at the hands of prime minister, emerging of the majoritarian trends, personalisation of power, Iack of accountability, and aggravaıion of rclaıions between the executiye branch and legislature. Naomi Chazan, a Mereız 47 MK and the former Deputy Spcaker of the Knesset, argues that the combination of all the se create a chaoıic siluation in which autocracy and anarchy coexisı. According to her, therefore, this new system makes impossible to rule the country.48 With this assertion in mind, in the rest of this paper, we will endeavour 10 elaborate on these implications in detaiIs.
Extreme Fragmentatioll
One of the assertions is that direct elections have fostered the aIready existing fractionalisation in the Israeli party system. However, mereIy reckoning ıhe numbers of parti es and factions within the current Knesset and then comparing this with those numbers of previous Knessets might not help us to confırm this assenion or hypothesis. Since numerical superiority might be misicading. For instance, a fıfteen-party Knesset may give us a false impression that it is more fra~mented than a thirteen-party Knesset (as Table 1 denotes, the Il t Knesset with 15 parties was less fragmented than the 9 th Knesset with 13 parties). Therefore, wc need a reliable formula to measure the "effective numbers of parties" and the degree of "fragmentaıion". In this study, i will mainly use three indices: the Laaksorraagepera Index of effectiye number of parties (Nv),49 the MoHnar Index of number of parti es (Np),50 and the Rae Index of party system fragmentation (F).51
The Laakso{faagepera Index (Nv) quantifies how many parties are in the party system by weighting according to size. However, Molinar argues that "Nv" yields higher values by overcounting the largest party. Thus, he proposes an alternatiye index (Np) which counts the winning party differently from the rest. In the light of this remark, the scientific scepticism compels mc to look at the case of Israel, by using thcse both indices at the same time. On the other hand, the Rae Index of fractionalisation (F) measures the probability that two randomly selccted legislators belong to different parties. il varies from zero (all legislators are members of the same party-zero fractionalisation) to one (each legislator is the only representative of her or his party-extreme fractionalisation).52 Where "Nv" is the number of effecıiye parties expressed in votes and "Pi" is the fractional share of voıes of lhe ith party. If eyery party has an equal share of yotes, the number of eırectiye parties is equalto the actual number of parties. For unequal parly sizes, wc usuaIIy obtain a fractional value of "Ny". Also, the Rae index (F) can be deriyed from the effectiye number of parties through a simpIe algebraic transfonnation:
On the other hand, the Molinar index can be acquired through following formula:
peculiarity of the Israeli democracy, one may say that the extremely law quaIifying threshold has brought about the direct reflection of social cleavages on to parliamentary politics. Whereas there were II parties in the outgoing parIiament, currently 15 parties are entitIed to Knesset seats. However, it is apparent that in the 14 th and IS th Knessets, there has be en no unprecedented change in terms of number of parties. Since before the change in electoraI system, there were Knessets with the same number of parties, such as the Sth Knesset with 11 parties and, the ı nd , II th and 12 th Knessets with 15 parties. However, on this ground, it cannot be claimed that nothing has changed with regard to effectiye number of parti es and the degree of fragmentation. Should we read the column indicating the Laaksoffaagepera Index of the effective number of parties (Nv), we notice that whiIe in 1996 it was indicating its third highest rate ever with a six-party system, it reached its zenith with a ten-party system foIIowing the 1999 elections. On the other hand. the Molinar Index (Np) yields more striking results. Since it reads that the highest rates are obtained with 4.26 and 6.96 in 1996 and 1999 elections respectively. In discussion of fractionalisation, the Rae Index (F) which inherently releases similar results with the Laaksoffaagepera Index, marks drastic changes in the recent years. Particularly, it is virtuaIIy marking an extreme fractionalisation rate with 0.91 in 1999. Therefore, it might be concluded that the quantitative data confınns the oft-repeated cliche that the new clectoral system has contributed to further fragmentation of Israeli politics. Hercafter, tackIing more practical features of the issue, I shaII focus on the causes that have opened the way to this unintended resull.
Tlıe Clıangiııg Elec/oral Behaviour: Spli/-ricket Vo/ing
There are few Westem democracies that face the diffıcuIt task of effectivcly goveming a society th3t posscsses as manyas social, poIitical and ideological clcavages as is the state of Israel. 53 The population of IsraCı is divided along various cleavages such as the Jews and Arabs; Ashkenazim and Scphardim; secular and reIigious; 53A. Diskin, Elecıions and Va/ers in Israel, New York, Praeger, 1991, p. 13. hawks and doves; "Russians" and differing social classes. 54 Moreover, these cleavages oflen occur as overlapping divisions posing a possible danger to Israeli democracy. In tenns of reported voting behaviours, while many religious, Sephardim, less educated and lower-status workers tend to vote for the Likud and rcligious parties, the other group having a disproportionate share of secular, upper-class Ashkenazim mostly vote for Labour and Meretz.55 Having ideologised the existing divisions, this correlation bctween the voting behaviour and social, ethnic, and religious identity has polarised the society around the two major parties and their components. According Lo Asher Arian, Lhis reported importance of identification with the parLy peaked in the ı980s prior to introduction of direct elccLions. lt is also argued that Israeli voters were loyal to their parties and Lcnded Lo support them regardless of the issues presented and the personalities heading the lists,56 since under the old system, the only way to influence the clection of the prime-minister was to vote for Lhe larger parties. Howevcr, voters who in the past oscillaLed beLween a major party and one of its potential coalition partners, buL cast Lheir single ballot for the major party not to wasLe their voLe no longer have to decide. 57 With regard to recent elecLions, whaL appears to be the case is that the split-ballot system was in a sense "liberaLing" for Israeli voters. 58 Apparently, with the direct elccLion of the prime minister most voters, afler having cast thcir yotes for Lhe prime minister, inclined to vote for one of the small parlies close to their hearts. 59 The logic of this new elcctoral behaviour was pmnounced by the brilliant electoral slogan of the Third Way that compared voting for the same party in both prime minisLerial and party vote to "putting bread in pita".60 it has been argued ıhal ıhis changing elecıoral behaviour or split-ticket yoting has aggravaıed political fragmentation by empowering the "smailcr" panies aL the expense of the larger and ideological ones. However, the resuILs of the lası two elections indicated thaı this assenion is not true, bul noı wrong at alL. Therefore, it needs to be modilied. In analysing the impact of the new sysıem, it should be noted that iı did noı increase the electoral power of all small parties. As Table 3 denotes that while Meretz lost 3 seats, United Torah Judaism (UTJ) only retained its parliamentary share in 1996. Moreover, lhe resulls of the 1999 elections represent a more confusing picıure. Sincc, Table 3 reads that while Y'lsrael Be'aliyah has declined from 7 seats in 1996 to 6 seats in 1999, the Third Way losı its all 4 seaıs and Hadash lost 2 of its 5 seats in the 15th Knessel. However, an analysis based on blocks rather' than individual parlies mighı be more helpfuı. Hence, referring to Table 3 , iı may be underlined ıhat Arab parties, rcligious parlies and Russian parlies have increased their representation in the current Knessel. On the contrary, the results conceming lhe two large panies indicaıe a drastic deciine from 1992 to 1999. While the Likud feıı down from 32 seats in 1992 to 22 seats in 1996 and to 19 in 1999; Labour faced a more dramatic panorama which is an extreme faıı from 44 seats in 1992 to 34 seats in 1996 and to 26 seats in 1999. Therefore, in the light of given daıa, it should be concluded thal the new system has favoured the ethnic, sectaıian and religious paniesbut not all small parti es at the expense of idealagical and major parties.
Hereafter, i will elaboraıe on the reported implicaıions of the split-ticket voling on lhe individual parti es and blocks. Inilially, i will commence my analysis wiıh religious or ethno-sectarian parties.
-Proliferation of Ethno-Sectarian Parties
Split-ticket voling was the dominant feature of the ı996 and ı999 elections. In this respecı, Table 2 reveals that communities with strong concentraıions of observant Jews, nominally Bnei Brak (Iargely haredi, ultra-orthodox non-Zionist) and Jerusalem (both haredi and orthodox-Zionisı) have ıhe highest vote-spliuing rates with the "non-Jewish seıılements" (mainly Israeli Arabs) and Nazareth (Iargest Arab cily in lhe counıry). IL implies that these communities are those who gained ıhe most from the new electoral system aIıhough the change in elccloral laws was motivated by the desire to reduce the power of smail parti es and religious parties in particular. Put in other way, bencfiling from lhe dual-ballot system, orthodox religious voıers gaye a rise to their sectanan parties by means of the second ballol. 61
The religious parties generalIy have received about 15 percent of the vote, allhough in 1996 and 1999 this sh ot up to 20 per cent (meaning 23 sc als in i996 and 27 seals in ı999) and they were regular coalition partners in ıhe majority of governments, whether headed by Labour or Likud. The surge of the religious parties in the last two elecıions was based on broad ethnic support, wiıh different eıhnic groups supporting the three religious parties. United Torah Judaism (UTJ) was largcly Ashkenazi, Shas mostly Sephardi, and the Naıional Religious Party (NRP), drawing its support from both eıhnic groups.62 Wiıh regard to electoral performance of each party, it should be recorded ıhat Shas has indicated the most sıable progress since i 984 by inercasing its share of votes. Since ıhen, iı has permanenıly mulliplied its support among the traditional Sephardim. it also secms to have aUracted many voters who were noı necessarily religious bul had bencfited in some way from its exıensive neıwork of social services and free 61M. Arens, "Firsı Things First", lIa 'aretz, 20 Augusı 1998. 62Arian, The Second Republic, pp. 213-221. education opportunities. 63 Parallel to its inereasing power, Shas replaced the NRP as pivotal party and became the only religious party in Rabin's coalition govemment in 1992. Shas maintained its position in Netanyahu and Barak governments following the 1996 and 1999 elections.
-Ascendancy of Arab Sector
Adoption of direct elcctions was welcomed in the Arab sector who se majority has traditionally votcd for Labour or parties that support Labour coalition. It was expectcd that new system would em power the Arab parties' bargaining powcr. Since Labour's candidate needcd full backing of Israeli Arabs to become prime minister, Arab parti es would presumably fınd themselves in a stronger position to exact concession from Labour. A second assumption was that Arab electorate would finally manage to convert its numerical strength into political influence. 64 In fact, Arab parties managed to increase their representation from 5 seats in 1992 to 9 seats in 1996 and to LO seats in 1999. Howcver, it is stilI far from reflceting their real potential. Israeli Arabs currently number about one million people (around the 18 per cent of Israel's population). Approximately, 480,000 of them (l2 per cent of the entire Israeli electorate) are of voting age. Therefore, if voting as a monolith, Israeli Arabs could elect 14 membcrs to the Knesset. However, ideological and personal rivalries among Arab politicians have always prevented them from forming a common list. it was also true that mainly Labour, Meretz and Likud have attracted nearly 30 per cent of the valid Arab votes in 1996 and 1999.
With regard to fırst supposition, initially it should be stated that it was an inflated expectation. The majoritarian winner-take-all system turned the electoral process into a zero-sum game. In contrast to Knesset elections, the race for prime minister did not offer much of a choice: there were only two candidates both in ı996 and 1999. In this sensc, all voters had three options: the In the 1996 elections, the other emerging single-issue party scoring impressive results was the Third Way. In an environment escalated by growing anger to Labour's "territorial compromises", it was fonned by an interest group within the Labour party and was led by a Jewish senIement leader from the Golan Heights, Avigdor Kahalani. Since its primary objective was to keep the Golan Heights under Israeli rule, it opposed the peaee talks with Syria. The Third Way declined to support cither Peres or Netanyahu for prime minister, although manyol' its former members voted for Peres. Indeed, the party portraying itsclf as an agent of national consensus capable of bridging the gap between the moderate segments of the right and the left, positioned itself somewhere in the centre between Labour and Likud. While it managed to seize 4 seats in 1996, in the last eleetions it eould not pass the one-and-half per cent qualifying thrcshold as it won only 0.7 per cent . This dramatic decline has been explaincd by the emergence of The Centre Party and Shinui in the ecntre of the politieal spectrum, and the fading of the Golan Heights issue in the last elections. Figure 1 denotes the electoral performance of the two major parties and middle-sized parties recciving more than 5 per cent of the valid votes in the last two de cad es. It appears that arter a peak in 1981 (73 per cent) the total share of both Labour and Likud have diminished very consistently sinee that year. This rate fell to 66 per eent in ı984, to 61 per cent in i988, to 60 per cent in 1992 and to 53 and 34 per eents in 1996 and 1999 respectivcly. In this respeet, the eriticism that the new eleetoral system has brought about the decline of the major parties is unfounded. 69 As shown in Figure 1 , this decline had started before. However, it should also be noted 69C. Klein, "Direct Elcclion of the Priınc Minister in Isracl: The Basic Law in iLSFirst Year", European Pub/ic Law, Vol. 3, No. 3,1997, p. 310. that according to Figure ı, in ı996 and ı999 a more dramatic decline occurred while the numbers of middle-sized parties increased. In terms of scores recorded by both major parties, it might be noted that while Likud saved itself from a sharp upset because of its last minute coalition with Tsomet and Gesher, Labour faced a serious decay from 34.7 per cent to 27.5 per cent in 1996.7 0 In 1999, although, this time, Labour endeavoured to protect itself against further ebb and engaged with Gesher and Meimad, it could not reverse the trend and received 20.3 per cenL. Furthermore, Likud had performed no better than Labour by faIling down to 14.1 per cent. The more derogatory point was that Likud was almost being replaced by Shas as the second main party. Therc fore , it might be argued that the faII of major parties has been accelerated by the two-balIot system. In other words, it was only a catalyst rather than a "scapegoat" for which supporters of both parti es were looking.
-Decline of Major Partics
At this point, endeavouring to analyse the causes of this dedine, i should brieOy lOuch upon the tactical mistakes made by both parties in the cIectoral campaigns rather than merely reporting what happened in the i996 and 1999 elections. According to Susser, allhough both parti es understood early the unprecedented logic of direct cIectionvictory in the prime ministerial vote is considerably more important than the results of the party vote they seem to have exaggcrated this priority iAto a thoroughly lopsided division of cnergies. All the party's resources were focused on vicıory in the prime ministerial contest, while virtualIy nothing was invested in convincing yoters that a good party showing was an integral part of elccLOral success. They did not even bother to distinguish themselves from their potential coalition partners, to say noıhing about direcııy attacking them as was the common practice in previous elcctions.7 1 Among the other causes i can mention the recent Peace Process that has changed the electoral attitudes of both the electorate and parties, worsening economic situation, proliferation of religion within society and politics, secular versus orthodox polarisation, rising dissatisfaction of 700,000 new olim (Jewish immigrants), emergence of new central parties, and incapabiIily of boıh parti es to adapt themselves 70N. Lochcry, The Israe/i Labour Party, Bcrkshirc, 1997, pp. 259-263. 71Susscr, Direct Election of the Prime Minister, pp. 247-250. to changing conditions. 72 In addition, many discontented vaters have chosen to punish Labour and Likud for their corruption and maladministration in burcaueraey and polities.7 3 I have so far presented a brief framework in diseussion of split-tieket vating and its eonsequenees. it has been proved that this changing electoral behaviour eaused further atomisation of the Israeli party system by eatalysing the deeline of major parti es and eneouraging sectarian, ethnie and single-issue parties. This unintended result was welcomed by many proponents of the new law sinee they have argued that the new system provides an equitable and demoeratic framework within which the voters can satisfactorily signify their choice.7 4 As a result, however, one cannot say that Israeli society has become more democratic than before 1996. Conversely, in a highly fragmented society, such as Israel, emergence of a few mass centre parties undifferentiating social, ethnie, and seetarian cleavages with some other middle-sized or peripheral parti es might provide a more stable and favourable demoeratic environmenl.
The New Coalitioıı Politics
In no eleetion has a single list of candidates ever won an absolute majority of votes or an absolute majority of Knesset sc ats. Yet no government has ever be en established in Isracı that did not have, at 1east at the time it was formcd, the support of the majority of Knesset members.7 5 Thus, every Israeli government has bcen based on a coalition which was comprised of an absolute majority of Knesset members from various factions,?6 However, this is not to say that Isracı has cnjoyed stable and nourishing eoalitions 76A. Diskin, Elecıions and Voıers, p. 177.
throughout its history. As it was elucidated earIicr, coaIition governments have bcen extremely vu1nerable to extortion by their smail partners. The architects of the new system were seeking to insulate the prime minister from this kind of pressure, and felt that direct election of prime minister was an effective way to do this.
Below, i wiII look at the impIications of the new system on coaIition formatian process and aııitudes. In the Iight of the last two eleetions, initiaIIy it should be said the extent of bargaining with smaIl and middle-sized secıarian parties to form the eoaIition was as great as in the past. 77 The examples of Netanyahu and Barak govemments illustrated that prime ministers were stilI as dependent as their predecessors on their eoaIition partners. After mercIy two years in the office, it beeame quite obvious that both prime ministers were incapable of goveming the eountry beeause of endless eabinet crises. Consequemıy, having lo st their majority in the Knesset they boıh called for early elections.
Direct cIection of lhe prime minisler has altered the classical coalition-buiIding process. Both Netanyahu and Barak negotiated with their potemial coalitional parlners from a position of strength and exclusivity because ıhere were no oıher altematives open to the smail parti es (yet under the old system smail parti es were in a position to decide who wouJd be prime minister). EspeciaIIy, in the case of power-addict sectarian parlies such as NRP and Shas, joining the eoaIition, which meam inOuence, budgets, patronage, and ministries, became a viıal issue regardless of its east. For instance, needing the government allocations to nurture its impressive network of schools, educaıional programmes, day-care centres and charities,78 Shas did not hesiıate to dismiss its le ader Aryeh Deri to launch coaIition negotiaıions with Barak following the elections in ı999.7 9 77A. Arian, "The Israelj Elecıion for Prime Minister and the Knessct, 1996 ", Electoral Studies, Vol. ıs, No. 4, 1996 . 79MerelZ decIared that it would not lake a place in the same govemment with Shas as Jong as it was headed by Deri who was free pcnding an appeaJ against a four-year prison sentence for bribery and corruption. P. Kidron, "Barak Courts the Right", Middle East International, No. 601,4 June 1999, pp. 4-6. Under the previous single-ballot system, the heading party in the government usually controlled 40 or more Knesset seats, and needed to win over no more than two or three lesser factions to boost its numbers to the required 61 majority.80 However, under the new system, because of the fact that two major parties drastically lost their power, both Netanyahu and Barak had to negotiate with almost every small party or faction to reach the required absolute majority. Parallcl to their increasing vigour, smail parti es came to ask for higher demands in these coalitional negotiations. As a resull, while the number of ministries held by small parti es multiplicd, both Likud and Labour faced the bitter reality of controlling less than a majority within their own governments.
Lastly, another problem confronting the directly e1ccted premiers was the al1ocation of the limited number of cabinet seats. The new law restricted the maximum size of the cabinet to 18 members. Given that ceiling, Netanyahu and Barak faced the problem of making sure that they had enough Likud and Labour members in their cabinets while at the same time giying their coalition partners an acceptable levcl of cabinet positions. While Netanyahu created a new super ministry for Arici Sharon to satisfy the various factions within Likud, Barak expanded his government from 18 to 24 to ensure "the proper representation for each of the seven coalition parties by amending Basic Law: The Government". SI Opposing this expansion, Chazan a prominent member of Meretz which was Barak's coalition partner, said that financially this would raise the cost of the executiye branch by hundreds of millions of shekels every year. 82
The Absence ojChecks And Balances
Many critics argue that the new law has failed to provide any check s and balances normally considered necessary where central authority is vested in the chief of executive, such as those provided 80p. Kidron, "Coaliıion Dilernmas", Middle East International, No. 602, 18 June 1999 , pp. 6-8. 81p. Kidron, "Barak CharlS His Coursc", Middle East International, No. 604, 16 July 1999 , pp. 4-6. 82N. Chazan, "Compacı and Accounlablc", Jerusalem Post, 09 July 1999 by the United States constitution. 83 In the new system, partly by design, partly by accident the directly elected prime minister has become much more uncontrolled and autonomous vis-a-vis the legislature. However, according to Arian, the executiye branch in Israel always had disproportionate importance compared to the legislative branch. In this sense, the new system has only contributed to further exacerbation of the situation. 84 The critics are mainly targeting their arrows at three points that are the increasing uncontrolled power of the prime minister, emasculation of the Knesset and the changing feature of the relations between the executive and legislative branches. Hereafter, in discussion of checks and balances in the Israeli system, i will attempt to provide a general framework by assessing these arguments.
Initially, it should be noted that many social scientists and analysts have criticised the inıroduclion of a majoritarian system into a heterogeneous society that requires consensus structures such as Israeı. 85 Since, decisions about going to war, signing a peace and fıxing permanent borders are matters which require a broad-based consensus, one that can hardly be commanded by a prime minister elected by a razor-thin majority of the eligible voters (for instance, by rcIying on his bare plebiscitarian majority 50.4 per cent Netanyahu had profoundly divided Israeli society in pursuing his highly personal policy towards the Peace Process and implementation of the Os lo and Wye Plantation accords in particular). It is also claimed that adopıion of direct election has to be balanced by codification of a constitution with formal guarantees of fundamental rights. 86 This is because the existing Basic Laws 87 are inadequaıe to provide the citİzens and the Knesset 83 0. Capitanchik, "The Israeli General Election of 1996-Another Uphcaval", Governmenl and Opposiıion, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1996, p. 452. 84Arian, The Second Republic, pp. 238-239 with a shelter against the emergence of a premier with dictatorial powers. 88
The dual-ballot system puts enormous power in the hands of the prime minister. It is true that the individual elected was ehosen to have that power, but power uncheeked is a dangerous eommodity in a democracy. The troubling dilernma for Israel's demoeraey is the emergence of aleader popularly eleeted but unaceountable to his party and cabinet. 89 The premier takes on the role of producer and director of the entire show. As the secretarygeneral of the Labour Party asserts "[the prime minister] do es not allow ministers to partidpate in decision-making; he comes to meetings with his mind made up; and receives information from out side sources, which he trusts" and he continues "after all, we have a very dominating prime minister, who casts a shadow over the entire government".90
The new system underscores the strength of the prime minister and the weakness of the Knesset even more foreefuIly. The prime minister and the ministers who are the Icaders of the ruling coalition partners in effect totally control the legislature by imposing the whip of party discipline over their respective party backbenchers. 91
Furthermorc, by taking away the weapon of the no-eonfidcnce motion, the new law has left the Knesset totaııy powerless. While in the past losing a vote of confidence by any majority was sufficient to replace the government within the parliament, now it requires at least a majority of 61 Knesset members to pass a no-confidence mo tion in the prime minister which means early elections for both premier and the Knesset. However, despite this structural weakening, the 14 th Knesset (1996 Knesset ( -1999 has witnesscd vastly cxaggerated use of the no-eonfidenee mechanism. 92 In other words, the 0pposİtion turned the motion of no confidence into a "wcekly ritual",93 With regard to ehanging behaviour of the legis1ative branch, Hazan argues that notwithstanding the fact that the opposition is not abIe to reach the required 61 votes, it oflen aims to reduce the popular legitimacy of the prime minister by symbolically defcating the coalition parties by any simple majority since the coalition parties habitually abstain from these confidence votes. 94 This new attitude continue d in the ı5 th Knesset, while the opposition attempted to bring down the Barak govemment in its first three weeks by presenting four motions of no-confidence. 95
On the other hand the proponents of the new law argue that the Knesset is not relegated to an inferior status vis-a-vis the popularly elected prime minister. In a speech to the parliament, David Libai, daimed that still the prime minister must fornı a coalition since this is not a one-man rule. Therefore, if he wants to pass laws or his budget he must appea1 to majority in the Knesset. 96 Susser of the Bar-Ilan University notes that the new law has even reinforced the Kncsset to counterbalance the enhanced premier. In order to epitomise his argument he points to the following new powers of the KnesseL: an increase in the Knesset's role in regard to declaration of "state of emergeney", its new competence to summon any minister to appear before a Knesset commiltee (in the past, the minister had to agree to accept such an invitation), and its newly granted ability to vote no-confidence in a single minister (it needs 70 votes) without bringing down the govemment.
The New Role of the Presidellt
Under the old system, Israel's president assigned the task of forming a new cabinet to the Knesset member considered to have the best ch ane e of forming a viable govemmem coalition based on e1ection resulls. 97 This system had a certain dcgree of flexibility. Despite the fact that usually the head of the party, receiving the most votes was appointed prime minister-designate, this principle had few exceptions in practice. For instance, in 1983, Shamir was asked by the president to form a govemment after prime minister Begin's resignation, even though the Likud's Knesset delegation was smaller than the Alignment's.98 However, the new system eliminated the role of the president in selecting the prime minister sincc the latter is now automaticaııy elected by popular vote.
While, on the one hand, lhe new system diminished the role of the president by tuming him inıo an extremely symbolic he ad of state, on the oıher hand it added a new function to the presidency. According lO Basic Law: The Govemment, Artiele 22, the prime minister must obtain approval from the president of the state in order to disperse lhe Knesse1. 99 According to Hazan, this new role of the presidenı puıs him in aposilian above politics and requires him to act as an objecıive national figure. lOO Finaııy, it should be underlined that Basic Law: The President of State has to be amended in accordance wiıh new Basic Law: The Government, since the former legislaıion sıill contains same inconsistent provisions with the new role of the presidenLIOl Therefore, foııowing these necessary amendmenıs the functions and authority of the head of sıate musı be redefined. 102
Americanisation of Israeli Politics
Parallel to rising majoritarian trends, with the adoption of direct electian for lhe prime minister, the country's election campaigns have undergone a process of "Americanisation". According to Wilzig, "Americanisaıion" need not be a matter of blind transferralaf American campaign methods and st yle, for each country has distincıive social and cultural patterns, and one 04 December 1992. 102Editorial,"Destroying Presideney", Jerusa/em Post, 30 J une 1998. would expect such "borrowing" to be adapted to the receiving political framework in a fashion fıtting to that system. 103 In this respect, I shaII mainly touch upon the so-ca1led "pcrsonaIisation" and "privacisation" of IsraeIi politics.
As I elucidated earIier, the new eleetoral system has drawn pubIic attention to the direct eleetion of the prime minister and aftermath of eleetions to the personaIity of popularly elected prime minister by putting the parties and the Knesset eleetions in a seeondary pasition. Despite the faet that the new legislation did not take effect until i996, the impaet of this i992 reform was aıready felt during the 13Lh KnesseL, whose parti es and politicians behaved as though reform were already in plaee. Prime Minister Rabin, prior to his assassinaLion, functioned in a manner whieh many MKs, even those in his party, branded as presidentiaı. I04 Labour condueted its 1992 eleetion eampaign as if these were direct eleetions for the prime minisLer. The symbols of the party were changed: "Nationalist" blue replaeed red as the party's colour. The rhetoric was also altercd; from the usual eolleetive "we", Rabin turned to the eharismatie "I" (''1'11 Icad, 1'11guide, I'll determine", "My government" and so on). The Labour party even ehanged its name before the 1992 eleetion to "Labour Headed by Rabin".l 05 These changing eharaeLeristies of the cleeLoral eampaigns have forced traditional and unpopular Icaders into retirement. For instanee, f01l0wing the 1992 defeat, Likud had to replaee its old and laeklustre Icader with young Netanyahu who was highly conversant with Ameriean-style eampaigning. As a result of rising publie interests in the eandidates, appearances of the Icaders in media, and hours-Iong TV debaıes bet ween the Icading candidates have beeome very manipulatory in the last minute determination of the floating voters. 
S. Epilogue
This study has primarily focused on the direct elcction of the prime minister and its implicaLİons on Israeli politics. The analysis commenced by describing the environment in which the new electoral system emerged and followed by outlining the general features of this system. In discussing of the implications of the new electoral law, it was shown that the new system has brought about the rise of smail religious and ethnic lists and accelcrated the emasculation of major and ideological parlies within the Knesset. As a result of this unintended change in the party system, the coalitional politics and govemment formation processes have been drastically altercd. In addition, the changing role of the he ad of state and the de-ideologisation, personalisation and privacisation or in other words "Americanisation" of Isracli politics has been discussed.
This research has been constructed on the results of the 1996 and 1999 elections. In this regard, it should be bome in mind that any study resting on the data provided during such a limited period and a smail number of experiments might prevent us from reaching a clear-cut result. Howcver, with this remark in mind, it may be concluded that in the light of recent elections, Israeli l06H. Danna, "Nude Sara NCLanyahu Appears on Labour Web Site", Jerusa/em Post, 05 April 1999.
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D1RECf ELECfıONS IN ıSRAEL ıoı politics has become kss stable than it was bcfore the adoption of
Basic Law: The Govemment in March 1992.
As the last two elections of 1996 and 1999 demonstrated, the situation became worse after each election. The opponents of the system have widely argued that the next elections would perpctuate to destabiIize the Israeli politics unless the direct elections law was amended. However, without any change, Israel continued to hold special elections for the prime minister in February 2001.
Although the Basic Law: The Governmen! of 1992 provided itself with an "immunity" against future changes that the law could not be changed unless supported by a majority of at least 61 Knesset membcrs, a total amendment was possible only after AricI Sharon became the prime minister of Isracı. As part of a coalition agreement between the Likud and One Isracı (Labour block), on March 7, 2001, the Knesset overwhclmingly (in a 72-37 vote with three abstentions) decided to repeal the system of direct elections, and restored the one-vote parliamentary system of govemment that operated until 1996. The new law, which is to take effect in the elections for the next Knesset scheduled in Novembcr 2003, will also make a number of reforms to the old parliamentary system such as constructive no-confidence vote,107 and the mechanism enabling the prime minister to dissolve the Knesset. However, in order to overhaul the shortcomings of the existing system, Israel must still take this reform process further and increase the qualifying threshold, divide the country into electoral constituencies, and adopt the so-called "Norwegian Law ıııog which would strengthen both govemment and the Knesset, by restoring the check s and balances. At the end, given the fact that Israel can only start recovering the side-elTects of the untested remedy after 2003, until then the country would continue to suffer from the serious anomalics causcd by the system of direct clections. ı07A government cannot be toppled in a no-confidence vote without the support of 61 MKs, who must also declare support in writing for an alternative governmenL ıOgThis would have ministers automaticaııy resign from the Knessct on bcing appointed to the government in order to make room in the Knesset for the next person on the party lisı. 
